Partial Privatization and Subsidization in a Mixed Duopoly: R&D versus Output Subsidies
Partial Privatization and Subsidization in a Mixed Duopoly: R&D versus Output Subsidies
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DOI：
10.15057/28952
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发表时间：
2017-06
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
Sang‐Ho Lee;Timur K. Muminov;Yoshihiro Tomaru
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sang‐Ho Lee;Timur K. Muminov;Yoshihiro Tomaru
本研究探讨部分民营化下，混合双头垄断厂商之研发与产出补助。研究结果表明，产出补贴比R&D补贴具有更高的福利性，但产出补贴比R&D补贴更有利于政府对上市公司进行私有化。但是，当政府同时使用R&D和产出补贴的政策组合时，可以实现最优配置，其中私有化程度不影响产出补贴，但影响R&D补贴。
This study investigates R&D and output subsidies in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization. We show that an output subsidy is welfare-superior to an R&D subsidy policy, but the government has a higher incentive to privatize the public firm under the output subsidy than the R&D subsidy. However, when the government uses the policy mix of R&D and output subsidies together, it can achieve the first-best allocation, in which the degree of privatization does not influence output subsidies but influences R&D subsidies.