On the Optimal Provision of Social Insurance: Progressive Taxation Versus Education Subsidies in General Equilibrium
On the Optimal Provision of Social Insurance: Progressive Taxation Versus Education Subsidies in General Equilibrium
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论社会保险的最优供给：一般均衡下的累进税与教育补贴
DOI：
10.1016/j.jmoneco.2015.11.002
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Ludwig
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dirk Krueger;A. Ludwig
在本文中，我们计算的最优税收和教育政策的经济过渡，累进税提供社会保险的特殊的工资风险，但扭曲的家庭的教育决策。最佳选择的高等教育补贴可以减轻这些扭曲。我们强调了政策对熟练和非熟练工人相对工资的一般均衡反馈效应的定量重要性：补贴高等教育增加了具有大学学位的工人的比例，从而减少了具有重要再分配利益的大学工资溢价。我们还认为，转型路径的充分表征是政策评估的关键。我们发现，最优的教育政策总是以慷慨的学费补贴为特征，但所得税累进的最优程度关键取决于政策的过渡成本是否被明确考虑，以及大学溢价对一般均衡中政策变化的反应有多强烈。
In this paper we compute the optimal tax and education policy transition in an economy where progressive taxes provide social insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, but distort the education decision of households. Optimally chosen tertiary education subsidies mitigate these distortions. We highlight the quantitative importance of general equilibrium feedback effects from policies to relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers: subsidizing higher education increases the share of workers with a college degree thereby reducing the college wage premium which has important redistributive benefits. We also argue that a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. We find that optimal education policies are always characterized by generous tuition subsidies, but the optimal degree of income tax progressivity depends crucially on whether transitional costs of policies are explicitly taken into account and how strongly the college premium responds to policy changes in general equilibrium.