Market power in auction and efficiency in emission permits allocation.
Market power in auction and efficiency in emission permits allocation.
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jenvman.2016.08.083
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发表时间：
2016-12
影响因子：
8.7
通讯作者：
M. Jiang;Dong-Xiao Yang;Zi-yue Chen;P. Nie
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Jiang;Dong-Xiao Yang;Zi-yue Chen;P. Nie
本文分析了当生产市场中的单一主导企业在拍卖中具有市场力时，如何通过初始分配实现CO2排放权的成本效益，并比较了混合分配和单一拍卖两种主流分配模式。我们展示了具有市场支配力的企业如何操纵拍卖价格，从而导致拍卖无法实现成本有效的解决方案，除非分配的总许可等于有效的排放上限。在市场力厂商获得严格正的免费许可的条件下，混合分配的有效排放上限大于单一拍卖的有效排放上限。主导厂商的产品市场份额随着其所拥有的免费许可证的增加而增加。最后，本文分析了混合分配和单一拍卖的合规成本和福利，结果表明，在不考虑CO2排放的福利成本的情况下，决策者更倾向于选择混合分配。
This paper analyzes how to achieve the cost-effectiveness by initial allocation of CO2emission permits when a single dominant firm in production market has market power in auction, and compare two prevalent allocation patterns, mixed allocation and single auction. We show how the firm with market power may manipulate the auction price, thereby this leads to fail to achieve cost-effective solution by auction unless the total permits for allocation equal to the effective emissions cap. Provided that the market power firm receives strictly positive free permits, the effective emissions cap of mixed allocation is larger than that of single auction. The production market share of dominant firm is increasing with the free permits it holds. Finally, we examine the compliance costs and welfare of mixed allocation and single auction, the result show that the former is preferred to the later when policy makers consider economic welfare without welfare cost due to CO2emissions.