Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks
Attacks on Java Card 3.0 Combining Fault and Logical Attacks
复制标题
Java Card 3.0故障与逻辑结合攻击
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-642-12510-2_11
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发表时间:
2010
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Vincent Guerin
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
G. Barbu;Hugues Thiebeauld;Vincent Guerin
Java Cards have been threatened so far by attacks using ill-formed applications which assume that the application bytecode is not verified. This assumption remained realistic as long as the bytecode verifier was commonly executed off-card and could thus be bypassed. Nevertheless it can no longer be applied to the Java Card 3 Connected Edition context where the bytecode verification is necessarily performed on-card. Therefore Java Card 3 Connected Edition seems to be immune against this kind of attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate that running ill-formed application does not necessarily mean loading and installing ill-formed application. For that purpose, we introduce a brand new kind of attack which combines fault injection and logical tampering. By these means, we describe two case studies taking place in the new Java Card 3 context. The first one shows how ill-formed applications can still be introduced and executed despite the on-card bytecode verifier. The second example leads to the modification of any method already installed on the card into any malicious bytecode. Finally we successfully mount these attacks on a recent device, emphasizing the necessity of taking into account these new threats when implementing Java Card 3 features.
DOI:
--
发表时间:
2010
期刊:
--
影响因子:
--
作者:
D. Gollmann;Jean-Louis Lanet;Julien Iguchi-Cartigny
通讯作者:
D. Gollmann;Jean-Louis Lanet;Julien Iguchi-Cartigny