A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice
复制标题
集体选择的讨价还价模型
DOI：
10.2307/2586381
复制
发表时间：
2000
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
John Duggan
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Banks;John Duggan
通过将Baron-Ferreohn（1989）的讨价还价模型推广到多维空间模型，我们提供了一个集体决策的一般理论，将社会选择与个人的战略激励联系起来。我们证明了存在的静态平衡，上半连续的平衡结果的结构和偏好参数，以及等价的平衡结果和核心在某些环境中，包括一维的情况下。该模型产生的平衡预测，即使当核心是空的，它产生了一个“连续”的概括的核心在一些熟悉的环境中，核心是非空的。由于模型中对制度细节的描述很少，它适用于相对非结构化环境中的集体选择，并为立法和议会政治的一般分析提供了基准。
We provide a general theory of collective decision making, one that relates social choices to the strategic incentives of individuals, by generalizing the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model of bargaining to the multidimensional spatial model. We prove existence of stationary equilibria, upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium outcomes in structural and preference parameters, and equivalence of equilibrium outcomes and the core in certain environments, including the one-dimensional case. The model generates equilibrium predictions even when the core is empty, and it yields a “continuous” generalization of the core in some familiar environments in which the core is nonempty. As the description of institutional detail in the model is sparse, it applies to collective choice in relatively unstructured settings and provides a benchmark for the general analysis of legislative and parliamentary politics.