Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions
Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01891.x
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发表时间：
1976-05
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
F. Black;J. Cox
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
F. Black;J. Cox
在最近的一篇论文中，布莱克和斯科尔斯[3]提出了一个期权定价的显式均衡模型。在这篇论文中，他们指出，类似的分析可能适用于所有公司证券。在其他论文中，Merton[8]和Ross[11]都注意到期权定价论证的广泛适用性。与此同时，布莱克和斯科尔斯还指出，实际的担保契约具有各种条件，会给估值过程带来新的特点和复杂性。我们在本文中的目的是对这一估值过程作一些概括性的陈述，然后转向对实践中经常发现的某些类型的债券契约条款的分析。具体地说，我们将研究安全公约、从属安排和对国际金融公司融资的限制的影响。
IN A RECENT PAPER Black and Scholes [3] presented an explicit equilibrium model for valuing options. In this paper they indicated that a similar analysis could potentially be applied to all corporate securities. In other papers, both Merton [8] and Ross [11] noted the broad applicability of option pricing arguments. At the same time Black and Scholes also pointed out that actual security indentures have a variety of conditions that would bring new features and complications into the valuation process. Our objective in this paper is to make some general statements on this valuation process and then turn to an analysis of certain types of bond indenture provisions which are often found in practice. Specifically, we will look at the effects of safety covenants, subordination arrangements, and restrictions on the financing of inter