Responsible Party Government in a World of Interdependence
Responsible Party Government in a World of Interdependence
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DOI：
10.1080/01402382.2014.887874
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发表时间：
2014-03
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
R. Rose
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. Rose
本文通过增加对国家政府制定有效经济、国家安全和政治政策的能力的限制，开启了国家政府对其全国选民负责的封闭模式。这些限制来自于政策的相互依赖。欧盟通过理事会发挥非国家化影响力，通过欧洲议会发挥多国影响力，而欧元区则被设计成一个跨国技术官僚国家。跨越各大洲的政府间机构增加了进一步的限制。其结果是，国家政府在提供符合选民偏好的产出方面所做的努力与国家选民追究对国家成果产生重大影响的境外机构问责的能力之间的差距越来越大。结论考虑了三种潜在的可能性：对与政策无关的执政党轮换越来越感到沮丧；超国家层面的机构改革；以及一个学习过程，在这个过程中，认识到相互依赖的限制会导致期望的改变。
This article opens up the closed model of the responsibility of a national government to its national electorate by adding constraints on its capacity to enact effective economic, national security and political policies. These constraints come from policy interdependence. The European Union exerts a denationalising influence through the Council, a multinational effect through the European Parliament, and the eurozone is designed as a transnational technocracy. Intergovernmental institutions spanning continents add further constraints. The result is a growing gap between the efforts of a national government to deliver outputs that match the preferences of voters and a reduction in the capacity of national electorates to hold accountable institutions outside their country that have a major impact on national outcomes. The conclusion considers three prospective possibilities: a growing frustration with a policy-irrelevant rotation of parties in office; institutional reform at the supranational level; and a learning process in which a recognition of the constraints of interdependence leads to a change in expectations.