Pursuit and an evolutionary game
Pursuit and an evolutionary game
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追求与进化游戏
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
P. Krishnaprasad
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ermin Wei;E. Justh;P. Krishnaprasad
追逐是人类和动物从事的一种熟悉的机械活动--运动员追球，捕食者寻找猎物，昆虫在空中领地战斗中操纵。在这篇文章中，我们讨论和比较了追逐策略，一种被称为运动伪装的策略的发生本质，以及一些支持这种策略相对于替代策略流行的进化论点。我们讨论了追踪者实现运动伪装的反馈规律，以及两种替代策略。然后，我们建立了一个离散时间进化博弈模型来模拟这些策略之间的竞争。这导致了三维概率单纯形的动力学，它捕捉了进化博弈的平均场方面。将这一动态分析为求解线性规划问题的上升方程，与蒙特卡罗实验中观察到的行为一致，并支持运动伪装流行的进化基础。
Pursuit is a familiar mechanical activity that humans and animals engage in—athletes chasing balls, predators seeking prey and insects manoeuvring in aerial territorial battles. In this paper, we discuss and compare strategies for pursuit, the occurrence in nature of a strategy known as motion camouflage, and some evolutionary arguments to support claims of prevalence of this strategy, as opposed to alternatives. We discuss feedback laws for a pursuer to realize motion camouflage, as well as two alternative strategies. We then set up a discrete-time evolutionary game to model competition among these strategies. This leads to a dynamics in the probability simplex in three dimensions, which captures the mean-field aspects of the evolutionary game. The analysis of this dynamics as an ascent equation solving a linear programming problem is consistent with observed behaviour in Monte Carlo experiments, and lends support to an evolutionary basis for prevalence of motion camouflage.