Truthful Auction Analysis and Design in Multiunit Heterogenous Spectrum Markets With Reserve Prices
Truthful Auction Analysis and Design in Multiunit Heterogenous Spectrum Markets With Reserve Prices
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DOI：
10.1109/tccn.2020.2996602
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发表时间：
2021-03
影响因子：
8.6
通讯作者：
Wei Li;Xiuzhen Cheng;Z. Tian;Shengling Wang;R. Bie;Jiguo Yu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Wei Li;Xiuzhen Cheng;Z. Tian;Shengling Wang;R. Bie;Jiguo Yu
我们提出了一个实际的多单元异构频谱市场，其中每个买方可以在不同的地理区域请求具有不同投标价格的多个信道，并且每个信道与指示卖方的期望收入的保留价格相关联。在这样一个市场中，多单位交易和（保留和出价）价格多样性带来的自由度可以被利用来打破两个最流行的方案的真实性二级频谱拍卖，即迈尔森的最优机制（Myerson's Optimal Mechanism，简称EMT）和维克雷-克拉克-格罗夫斯（Vickrey-Clarke-Groves，简称VCG），通过投标人的自我共谋。本文对MOM和VCG不真实的根源进行了深入分析，并证明了解决MOM和VCG何时真实以及何时因投标操纵而破坏其真实性的基本理论。特别是，我们展示了如何利用自共谋在投标人报价和VCG，以提高不诚实的投标人的效用。这一重要发现为我们设计具有保留价的多单元异构频谱市场中的自合谋抵抗拍卖（SIRI）提供了指导。通过严格的理论分析，证明了SIRI的经济特性。
We a practical multiunit heterogeneous spectrum market in which each buyer may request multiple channels with different bid prices at different geographical regions and each channel is associated with a reserve price indicating the desired revenue of the seller. The degree-of-freedom brought by multiunit trading and (reserve and bid) price diversity in such a market can be exploited to break the truthfulness of the two most popular schemes adopted by secondary spectrum auctions, namely Myerson’s Optimal Mechanism (MOM) and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG), via bidder self-collusion. In this paper, we conduct a thorough analysis on the root causes of untruthfulness in MOM and VCG, and prove the fundamental theories addressing when MOM and VCG are truthful and when their truthfulness is broken by bid rigging. Particularly, we demonstrate how self-collusion is exploited in MOM and VCG to improve the untruthful bidders’ utility. The critical findings provide a guidance for us to design a Self-collusion Resistant Auction (SIRI) in multiunit heterogeneous spectrum markets with reserve prices. The economic properties of SIRI are proved via rigorous theoretical analysis.