Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
复制标题
交换经济受限领域的策略验证与效率
DOI：
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Schummer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Schummer
摘要。像Zhou（1991）对更大的领域所做的那样，我们表现出的同性，严格凸面的人交换经济，这种解决方案是必不可少的证明需要表现出高度完成的偏好，我们的搜索仍在一类线性偏好中，即使在这个“小”域中，这两个结果都会延伸到包括Zhou在内的许多超级群体。
Abstract. Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this “small” domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou’s.