Synthesis of Supervisors Robust Against Sensor Deception Attacks
Synthesis of Supervisors Robust Against Sensor Deception Attacks
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DOI：
10.1109/tac.2021.3051459
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发表时间：
2021-10-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Marchand, Herve
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Meira-Goes, Romulo;Lafortune, Stephane;Marchand, Herve
我们考虑反馈控制系统，其中传感器读数可能会被有意破坏系统的恶意攻击者破坏。我们利用离散事件系统技术，在控制系统的监控层研究这一问题。我们假设攻击者可以在系统传感器的输出到达监控控制器之前对其进行编辑。在这种背景下，我们提出了合成一个对传感器读数的编辑攻击具有健壮性的监督器的问题，并给出了这个问题的解决方法。这种方法将不完全信息自动机上的博弈技术与部分观测离散事件系统的监督控制理论的结果相结合。给出了所研究问题的充要条件。
We consider feedback control systems where sensor readings may be compromised by a malicious attacker intending on causing damage to the system. We study this problem at the supervisory layer of the control system, using discrete event systems techniques. We assume that the attacker can edit the outputs from the sensors of the system before they reach the supervisory controller. In this context, we formulate the problem of synthesizing a supervisor that is robust against the class of edit attacks on the sensor readings and present a solution methodology for this problem. This methodology blends techniques from games on automata with imperfect information with results from supervisory control theory of partially observed discrete event systems. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the investigated problem.