Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions.
Reputation Effects in Public and Private Interactions.
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DOI：
10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004527
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发表时间：
2015-11
影响因子：
4.3
通讯作者：
Nowak MA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ohtsuki H;Iwasa Y;Nowak MA
我们在间接互惠模型中研究合作的演变，在这种模型中，人们在公开和私下的情况下进行互动。公众互动有很高的机会被其他人观察，并总是影响声誉。私人互动被观察的机会较低，而且只会偶尔影响声誉。我们探索了所有的二阶社会规范，并研究了行动规则进化稳定的条件。我们观察到“诚实”和“虚伪”策略之间的竞争。前者既有公开的合作，也有私下的合作。后者在公开场合合作，在许多人观看的情况下，但在私下试图逃脱惩罚。这种虚伪的想法是，在私人情况下，合作不会带来回报，因为很可能没有人会注意到这一点。我们为诚实策略的演变找到了简单而直观的条件。我们研究了基于声誉的合作的演变。这种机制被称为间接互惠。在一个声名狼藉的世界里，人们帮助好人，却不帮助坏人。他们还会监控自己的声誉，以获得他人的回报。我们提出了一个新的间接互惠模型，其中存在两种类型的相互作用。在公共互动中，你的行为总是被其他人观察到。在私人互动中，你的行为不太可能被观察到。我们研究了诚实和虚伪策略之间的竞争。前者总是帮助好人，而后者只在私下互动中才能做到这一点。我们描述了诚实策略演变的条件。
We study the evolution of cooperation in a model of indirect reciprocity where people interact in public and private situations. Public interactions have a high chance to be observed by others and always affect reputation. Private interactions have a lower chance to be observed and only occasionally affect reputation. We explore all second order social norms and study conditions for evolutionary stability of action rules. We observe the competition between “honest” and “hypocritical” strategies. The former cooperate both in public and in private. The later cooperate in public, where many others are watching, but try to get away with defection in private situations. The hypocritical idea is that in private situations it does not pay-off to cooperate, because there is a good chance that nobody will notice it. We find simple and intuitive conditions for the evolution of honest strategies. We study the evolution of cooperation based on reputation. This mechanism is called indirect reciprocity. In a world of binary reputations, people help a good individual but do not help a bad one. They also monitor their own reputation to receive reciprocation from others. We propose a novel model of indirect reciprocity where two types of interactions exist. In a public interaction your behavior is always observed by others. In a private interaction, your behavior is less likely to be observed. We study the competition between honest and hypocritical strategies. The former always help good individuals, whereas the latter do so only in private interactions. We describe conditions for the evolution of honest strategies.