Horizontal Mergers and Divestment Dynamics in a Sunset Industry
Horizontal Mergers and Divestment Dynamics in a Sunset Industry
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夕阳产业中的横向合并和撤资动态
DOI：
10.1111/1756-2171.12161
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Masato Nishiwaki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tetsu Kawakami;Eri Yamada and Jiro Nemoto;山田恵里;山田恵里;Masato Nishiwaki
需求下降的行业往往由于业务窃取效应和固定成本的存在而长期资本过剩。这篇文章强调了合并的潜力，以内部化这种业务窃取效应，从而促进撤资。以日本水泥产业的兼并为例，通过动态的剥离模型，考察了这种兼并引起的剥离是否会提高总福利。研究结果表明，合并后的企业确实倾向于更积极地减少资本，而且，由于这些合并，尽管消费者剩余减少，总福利仍有所改善。
Industries with declining demand tend to be riddled with chronic excess capital due to the presence of a business‐stealing effect and fixed costs. This article highlights the potential of mergers to internalize this business‐stealing effect and thereby promote divestment. Using the case of mergers in the Japanese cement industry, it examines whether such merger‐induced divestment improves total welfare based on a dynamic model of divestment. The findings suggest that merged firms indeed tended to reduce capital more actively and that, as a result of these mergers, total welfare improved despite a reduction in the consumer surplus.