Leakage Power Analysis attacks: Well-defined procedure and first experimental results
Leakage Power Analysis attacks: Well-defined procedure and first experimental results
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泄漏功率分析攻击：明确定义的过程和第一个实验结果
DOI：
10.1109/icm.2009.5418592
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Trifiletti
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Massimo Alioto;L. Giancane;G. Scotti;A. Trifiletti
在本文中，攻击旨在恢复的秘密密钥的密码核心的静态（泄漏）功率的测量。这些攻击利用CMOS集成电路（IC）的泄漏电流对它们的输入的依赖性（例如，密码电路的秘密密钥）。因此，本文将这些新的攻击称为泄漏功率分析（LPA）攻击。由于在每个新技术节点处泄漏功率的增长速度远远快于动态功率，LPA攻击被证明是对亚100 nm技术中的密码电路的信息安全的严重威胁。在文献中，第一次提出了一个定义良好的过程来执行LPA攻击。与传统的基于动态功率测量的功率分析攻击相比，本文还分析了其优点和测量问题。最后首次对一个寄存器进行了实验性攻击。
In this paper, attacks aiming at recovering the secret key of a cryptographic core from measurements of its static (leakage) power are presented. These attacks exploit the dependence of the leakage current of CMOS Integrated Circuits (ICs) on their inputs (e.g., the secret key of a cryptographic circuit). For this reason, these novel attacks are referred to as Leakage Power Analysis (LPA) attacks in this paper. Since the leakage power increases much faster than the dynamic power at each new technology node, LPA attacks are shown to be a serious threat to information security of cryptographic circuits in sub-100 nm technologies. For the first time in the literature, a well-defined procedure to perform LPA attacks is presented. Advantages and measurement issues are also analyzed in comparison with traditional Power Analysis attacks based on dynamic power measurements. An experimental attack to a register is finally performed for the first time.