A Formal Framework for Provenance Security
A Formal Framework for Provenance Security
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来源安全的正式框架
DOI：
10.1109/csf.2011.26
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Cheney
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Cheney
出处或有关数据的起源，推导或历史记录的信息已成为一个重要的主题，尤其是对于网络上的共享科学或公共数据。它显然对安全性有影响（反之亦然），但这些含义并没有得到很好的理解。大量工作集中在录制，管理或使用某种出处信息的机制上，但是对定义出处并将其与可用性，机密性或隐私等安全目标相关联的基础模型取得了相对较少的进展。我们认为，这种基础对于在这些问题上取得有意义的进步至关重要，应开发。在本文中，我们概述了出处的正式模型，提出了诸如披露和混淆之类的出处的安全属性的形式化，并探索了它们基于自动机，数据库查询和工作流源图的域名。
Provenance, or information about the origin, derivation, or history of data, is becoming an important topic especially for shared scientific or public data on the Web. It clearly has implications on security (and vice versa) yet these implications are not well-understood. A great deal of work has focused on mechanisms for recording, managing or using some kind of provenance information, but relatively little progress has been made on foundational models that define provenance and relate it to security goals such as availability, confidentiality or privacy. We argue that such foundations are essential to making meaningful progress on these problems and should be developed. In this paper, we outline a formal model of provenance, propose formalizations of security properties for provenance such as disclosure and obfuscation, and explore their implications in domains based on automata, database queries and workflow provenance graphs.