Simultaneous First-Price Auctions with Preferences over Combinations : Identification , Estimation and Application ∗
Simultaneous First-Price Auctions with Preferences over Combinations : Identification , Estimation and Application ∗
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优先于组合的同时最高价拍卖：识别、估计和应用*
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发表时间：
2014
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通讯作者：
Pasquale Schiraldi
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作者：
Matthew Gentry;T. Komarova;Pasquale Schiraldi
同时投标在广泛的拍卖市场的实证流行的动机，我们开发和估计的结构模型的战略互动，在同时的第一价格拍卖时，对象是异质性和投标人有偏好的组合。我们开始，提出了一个一般的理论模型，投标在同时的第一价格拍卖，探讨性质的最佳对策和存在的均衡在这种环境下。然后，我们将该模型专门化为一个经验框架，在该框架中，竞标者对每个对象具有随机的私人估值和对组合的稳定增量偏好;当对组合的增量偏好为零时，这立即简化为标准的可分离模型。我们建立了非参数识别的标准排除限制下产生的模型，从而提供了一个测试和估计的组合偏好的基础。然后，我们将我们的模型应用于密歇根州交通部高速公路采购拍卖的数据，我们量化的成本协同效应的大小，并评估可能的效率损失所产生的同时投标在这个市场上。我们感谢Philip Haile、Ken Hendricks、Paul Klemperer和Balazs Szentes的评论和见解。我们还要感谢威斯康星州（麦迪逊）大学、苏黎世大学、鲁汶大学、卡迪夫大学、牛津大学、康奈尔大学、东安格利亚大学和巴黎第一大学的研讨会参与者进行了有益的讨论。伦敦经济学院，m.l. lse.ac.uk英国伦敦经济学院，t. lse.ac.uk英国伦敦经济学院和CEPR，p. lse.ac.uk
Motivated by the empirical prevalence of simultaneous bidding across a wide range of auction markets, we develop and estimate a structural model of strategic interaction in simultaneous first-price auctions when objects are heterogeneous and bidders have preferences over combinations. We begin by proposing a general theoretical model of bidding in simultaneous first price auctions, exploring properties of best responses and existence of equilibrium within this environment. We then specialize this model to an empirical framework in which bidders have stochastic private valuations for each object and stable incremental preferences over combinations; this immediately reduces to the standard separable model when incremental preferences over combinations are zero. We establish non-parametric identification of the resulting model under standard exclusion restrictions, thereby providing a basis for both testing on and estimation of preferences over combinations. We then apply our model to data on Michigan Department of Transportation highway procurement auctions, we quantify the magnitude of cost synergies and assess possible efficiency losses arising from simultaneous bidding in this market. ∗We are grateful to Philip Haile, Ken Hendricks, Paul Klemperer, and Balazs Szentes for their comments and insight. We also thank seminar participants at the University of Wisconsin (Madison), the University of Zurich, University of Leuven, Cardiff University, Oxford University, Cornell University, the University of East Anglia, and Universitie Paris 1 for helpful discussion. †London School of Economics, m.l.gentry@lse.ac.uk ‡London School of Economics, t.komarova@lse.ac.uk §London School of Economics and CEPR, p.schiraldi@lse.ac.uk