Information Transmission in Emerging Markets: The Case of a Unique Financing Instrument
Information Transmission in Emerging Markets: The Case of a Unique Financing Instrument
复制标题
新兴市场的信息传输：独特融资工具的案例
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hammad Siddiqi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hammad Siddiqi
信息流动是金融市场良好运作的必要条件。然而，在许多新兴市场，适当信息流动的法律的和体制的先决条件没有得到满足。这些市场如何应对？我们认为，他们通过开发创新的信息传输机制。我们确定了一个这样的机制与南亚股市的演变。该机制通过印度和巴基斯坦特有的融资工具运作，当地称之为badla。我们开发了一个信号模型，在该模型中，经纪人金融家通过选择在巴德拉市场上为股票提供不同水平的融资来向投资者发送他的私人信息。一个完全分离的均衡存在，允许充分区分各种类型的股票。因此，信息传递是通过这个渠道进行的。
Information flows are necessary for well-functioning financial markets. However, in many emerging markets, the legal and institutional preconditions for proper information flow are not met. How do such markets respond? We argue that they respond by developing innovative information transmission mechanisms. We identify one such mechanism associated with the evolution of equity markets in South Asia. The mechanism operates through a financing instrument unique to India and Pakistan, called badla in local parlance. We develop a signaling model in which a broker-financier signals his private information to investors by choosing various levels of financing to provide in the badla market for stocks. A fully separating equilibrium exists allowing full discrimination of various types of stocks. Hence, information transmission takes place through this channel.