On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning
On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning
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DOI：
10.1080/13546780601008825
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发表时间：
2007-11-01
影响因子：
2.6
通讯作者：
Evans, Jonathan St. B. T.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Evans, Jonathan St. B. T.
在本文中，我表明，推理和判断的双重过程理论如何解释系统 1（启发式）和系统 2（分析）过程之间的冲突，需要在未来的研究工作中予以阐明和解决。我证明了描述这种冲突的简单加性概率模型可以映射到三种不同的认知模型。先发制人的冲突解决模型假设从一开始就决定是通过启发式过程还是分析过程来控制响应。并行竞争模型假设每个系统并行运行以提供假定的响应，有时会导致需要解决的冲突。最后，默认干预模型涉及启发式系统对默认响应的提示，该提示可能会或可能不会被分析系统的后续干预改变。这次讨论还出现了第二个独立的问题。能力较高的参与者在推理任务中的优异表现可能是由于他们进行了更多的分析推理（数量假设），或者是因为他们应用的分析推理更有效（质量假设）。
In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic process will control the response. The parallel-competitive model assumes that each system operates in parallel to deliver a putative response, resulting sometimes in conflict that then needs to be resolved. Finally, the default-interventionist model involves the cueing of default responses by the heuristic system that may or may not be altered by subsequent intervention of the analytic system. A second, independent issue also emerges from this discussion. The superior performance of higher-ability participants on reasoning tasks may be due to the fact that they engage in more analytic reasoning (quantity hypothesis) or alternatively to the fact that the analytic reasoning they apply is more effective (quality hypothesis).