A Model of Plan Inference That Distinguishes Between the Beliefs of Actors and Observers
A Model of Plan Inference That Distinguishes Between the Beliefs of Actors and Observers
复制标题
区分参与者和观察者信念的计划推理模型
DOI：
10.3115/981131.981160
复制
发表时间：
1986
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Pollack
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Pollack
对话中的现有计划推论（PI）的现有模型假设正在推断计划的代理（演员）和绘制推理的代理人（观察者）对域中的行动具有相同的信念。我认为，这种假设通常会导致PI过程和PI旨在支持的交流过程失败。特别是，它排除了对无效计划产生的查询的原则性生成。我描述了放弃此假设的PI模型。它基于对计划作为心理现象的分析。判断计划是无效的，这与观察者归因于演员的信念之间的特殊差异有关，而当前者认为后者有一定的计划以及观察者本人所拥有的信念。我表明，对查询的适当响应的内容受到任何此类信念差异的类型的影响，该差异被认为是在该计划的基础上推断出的计划中存在的。此处描述的PI模型是用Spirit实施的，这是一个小型演示系统，回答有关计算机邮件领域的问题。
Existing models of plan inference (PI) in conversation have assumed that the agent whose plan is being inferred (the actor) and the agent drawing the inference (the observer) have identical beliefs about actions in the domain. I argue that this assumption often results in failure of both the PI process and the communicative process that PI is meant to support. In particular, it precludes the principled generation of appropriate responses to queries that arise from invalied plans. I describe a model of PI that abandons this assumption. It rests on an analysis of plans as mental phenomena. Judgements that a plan is invalid are associated with particular discrepancies between the beliefs that the observer ascribes to the actor when the former believes that the latter has some plan, and the beliefs that the observer herself holds. I show that the content of an appropriate response to a query is affected by the types of any such discrepancies of belief judged to be present in the plan inferred to underlie that query. The PI model described here has been implemented in SPIRIT, a small demonstration system that answers questions about the domain of computer mail.