Joint Production Games And Share Functions
Joint Production Games And Share Functions
复制标题
联合制作游戏及共享功能
DOI：
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Cornes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Hartley;R. Cornes
在非合作博弈中，参与人i的收益通常表示为所有参与人策略向量的函数。然而，在某些博弈中--“简单可约博弈”--参与人i的收益是两个参数的函数--i选择的策略，以及博弈中所有参与人的策略之和。古诺寡头垄断、公共物品提供、成本和剩余共享、开放获取资源开发都是简单可约博弈。我们定义了一个简单的可约博弈的“分享函数”。我们指出了它在分析简单可约博弈的均衡存在性、唯一性和比较静态性质中的作用，并将其应用于一个开放获取资源开发模型。最后，我们建议进一步的应用和扩展我们的方法。
Player i's payoff in a noncooperative game is generally expressed as a function of the vector of strategies of all players. However, in some games - 'simply reducible games' - the payoff of player i is a function of two arguments - the strategy chosen by i, and the sum of the strategies of all players in the game. Cournot oligopoly, public good provision, costand surplus-sharing, and open access resource exploitation are all simply reducible games. We define the 'share function' of a simply reducible game. We indicate its role in the analysis of equilibrium existence, uniqueness and comparative static properties of simply reducible games, and apply it to a model of open access resource exploitation. Finally, we suggest further applications and extensions of our approach.