Controller Switching-Enabled Active Detection of Multiplicative Cyberattacks on Process Control Systems
Controller Switching-Enabled Active Detection of Multiplicative Cyberattacks on Process Control Systems
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DOI：
10.23919/acc53348.2022.9867804
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发表时间：
2022-06
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Shilpa Narasimhan;N. El‐Farra;Matthew J. Ellis
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文献类型：
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作者：
Shilpa Narasimhan;N. El‐Farra;Matthew J. Ellis
本文主要研究如何在过程控制系统中增强网络攻击检测能力。首先，对一类基于残差的检测方案严格分析了闭环稳定性与攻击可检测性之间的关系。结果用于识别一组控制器参数（称为“攻击敏感”控制器参数），在这些参数下，攻击可以使闭环系统不稳定。攻击敏感控制器参数的选择可以提高检测攻击的能力，但也会降低无攻击闭环系统的性能。为了平衡这种权衡，开发了一种新的主动攻击检测方法，该方法使用控制器参数在标称控制器参数（根据标准控制设计准则选择）和攻击敏感控制器参数之间切换。将该方法应用于一个化学过程实例，以验证其检测乘式传感器-控制器通信链路攻击的能力。
This work focuses on the problem of enhancing cyberattack detection capabilities in process control systems subject to multiplicative cyberattacks. First, the relationship between closed-loop stability and attack detectability with respect to a class of residual-based detection schemes is rigorously analyzed. The results are used to identify a set of controller parameters (called "attack-sensitive" controller parameters) under which an attack can destabilize the closed-loop system. The selection of attack-sensitive controller parameters can enhance the ability to detect attacks, but can also degrade the performance of the attack-free closed-loop system. To balance this trade-off, a novel active attack detection methodology employing controller parameter switching between the nominal controller parameters (chosen on the basis of standard control design criteria) and the attack-sensitive controller parameters, is developed. The proposed methodology is applied to a chemical process example to demonstrate its ability to detect multiplicative sensor-controller communication link attacks.