P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?
P2P Lenders versus Banks: Cream Skimming or Bottom Fishing?
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P2P贷款机构与银行：撇脂还是抄底？
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.3174632
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
A. Thakor
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Calebe de Roure;L. Pelizzon;A. Thakor
我们从银行与 P2P 贷款机构的竞争模型中得出三个可检验的预测：（i）当一些银行面临外生性更高的监管成本时，P2P 贷款就会增长；（ii）P2P 贷款的风险高于银行贷款； (iii) P2P 贷款的风险调整利率低于银行贷款。我们用 P2P 贷款和德国消费银行信贷市场的数据来对比这些预测，并找到实证支持。总体而言，我们的分析表明 P2P 贷款机构正在抄底，特别是当监管冲击给一些银行带来竞争劣势时。关键词：P2P借贷、银行借贷、竞争
We derive three testable predictions from a bank-P2P lender model of competition: (i) P2P lending grows when some banks are faced with exogenously higher regulatory costs, (ii) P2P loans are riskier than bank loans; and (iii) the risk-adjusted interest rates on P2P-loans are lower than those on bank loans. We confront these predictions with data on P2P loans and the consumer bank credit market in Germany and find empirical support. Overall, our analysis indicates the P2P lenders are bottom fishing, especially when regulatory shocks create a competitive disadvantage for some banks. Keywords: P2P lending, bank lending, competition