Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly With Entry and Exit
Strategic Commitment Versus Flexibility in a Duopoly With Entry and Exit
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进入和退出双寡头垄断中的战略承诺与灵活性
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.498582
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Francisco Ruiz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Francisco Ruiz
我们提出了一个连续时间的真实的期权博弈，在这个博弈中，两个公司必须在每一个时刻决定是否进入或退出一个扩展到一个随机到期日的市场，并在此后签订合同。企业之间的差异仅在于使用其所使用资产的机会成本（例如，由于重新部署或转售价值不同），因此它们的投资不能同等地收回。本文理清了影响进入和退出顺序的诸多方面，并对一种普遍的看法提出了挑战，即一个沉没成本高于其唯一竞争对手的公司有资格致力于争夺市场（如果必要的话），并且更好地抵御不确定性的不利影响。我们的分析还表明，如果竞争对手在投资后保持活跃的承诺是不可信的，那么优先购买权对期权价值的威胁的破坏性影响可能会减弱。
We present a continuous-time real options game in which two firms must decide at each instant of time whether to be in or out of a market that expands up to a random maturity date and contracts thereafter. Firms differ only in the opportunity costs of usage of the assets they employ (e.g., owing to different redeployment or resale values), so their investments are not equally recoverable. The paper disentangles the numerous aspects that affect the order of entry and exit, and it challenges the common wisdom that a firm with a sunk cost higher than that of its sole competitor is credibly committed to fight for the market (if necessary) and is worse shielded against the adverse effects of uncertainty. Our analysis also shows that the destructive effect of the threat of preemption on option values may be softened if the rival's commitment to remain active after investing is not credible.