Low-Data Complexity Attacks on Camellia
Low-Data Complexity Attacks on Camellia
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DOI：
10.1007/978-981-10-5421-1_11
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发表时间：
2017-07
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Takeru Koie;Takanori Isobe;Yosuke Todo;M. Morii
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文献类型：
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作者：
Takeru Koie;Takanori Isobe;Yosuke Todo;M. Morii
在这篇文章中，我们提出了对减少轮Camellia的低数据复杂度攻击。我们的攻击是基于确定性的截断微分特征，利用二进制矩阵的性质和Camellia的S盒的微分性质。结合山茶花的结构，我们得到了对4到7轮山茶花的低数据复杂度攻击。令人惊讶的是，只要选择两个明文，4到6轮攻击是可行的，并且通过增加少量数据，攻击的复杂性变得非常实用。
In this paper, we propose low-data complexity attacks on reduced-round Camellia. Our attacks are based on deterministic truncated differential characteristics exploiting properties of binaries matrices and differential properties of S-boxes of Camellia. Combining these with the structure of Camellia, we obtain low data complexity attacks on 4 to 7 rounds of Camellia. Surprisingly, 4 to 6 rounds attacks are feasible with only two chosen plaintexts and the attacks complexity becomes very practical by increasing a small amount of data.