Quantifying information leaks in software
Quantifying information leaks in software
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DOI：
10.1145/1920261.1920300
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发表时间：
2010-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Heusser;P. Malacaria
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Heusser;P. Malacaria
机密信息的泄露是一个严重的安全风险。尽管有许多新颖的理论进展，但目前还不清楚衡量机密信息泄露的量化方法是否以及如何应用于实质性的现实世界项目。这在很大程度上是因为计算精确的泄漏量的高度复杂性。在本文中，我们介绍了一种技术，它可以借助有界模型检测来确定程序是否符合可伸缩到大状态空间的量化策略。我们的技术被应用于许多官方报告的Linux内核中的信息泄漏漏洞。此外，我们还分析了安全远程密码套件和Internet消息支持协议实现中的身份验证例程。我们的技术可以显示何时存在不可接受的泄漏；同样的技术也首次用于验证所应用的软件补丁是否确实堵塞了信息泄漏。这是解决现实世界工业项目安全问题的定量信息流的第一次演示。
Leakage of confidential information represents a serious security risk. Despite a number of novel, theoretical advances, it has been unclear if and how quantitative approaches to measuring leakage of confidential information could be applied to substantial, real-world programs. This is mostly due to the high complexity of computing precise leakage quantities. In this paper, we introduce a technique which makes it possible to decide if a program conforms to a quantitative policy which scales to large state-spaces with the help of bounded model checking. Our technique is applied to a number of officially reported information leak vulnerabilities in the Linux Kernel. Additionally, we also analysed authentication routines in the Secure Remote Password suite and of a Internet Message Support Protocol implementation. Our technique shows when there is unacceptable leakage; the same technique is also used to verify, for the first time, that the applied software patches indeed plug the information leaks. This is the first demonstration of quantitative information flow addressing security concerns of real-world industrial programs.