Stochastic Side-Channel Leakage Analysis via Orthonormal Decomposition
Stochastic Side-Channel Leakage Analysis via Orthonormal Decomposition
复制标题
通过正交分解进行随机侧通道泄漏分析
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-69284-5_2
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发表时间：
2017
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
O. Rioul
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Guilley;Annelie Heuser;Ming Tang;O. Rioul
最大效率的侧信道攻击需要泄漏函数的准确知识。模板攻击已经由Chari等人在CHES 2002上引入，以使用可用的训练数据来估计泄漏函数。Schindler等人在CHES 2005上注意到，如果评估者对泄漏函数有一些先验知识，则可以减轻分析的复杂性。Schindler最初的想法是，工程师可以从电路的结构中模拟泄漏。然而，对于一些薄CMOS技术或一些先进的对策，工程师的直觉可能是不够的。因此，基于剖面分析的泄漏函数推断仍然是重要的。然而，在现有技术中，剖析阶段是基于非正交基中的线性回归来进行的。这并不容易解释，因为组件不是独立的。
Side-channel attacks of maximal efficiency require an accurate knowledge of the leakage function. Template attacks have been introduced by Chari et al. at CHES 2002 to estimate the leakage function using available training data. Schindler et al. noticed at CHES 2005 that the complexity of profiling could be alleviated if the evaluator has some prior knowledge on the leakage function. The initial idea of Schindler is that an engineer can model the leakage from the structure of the circuit. However, for some thin CMOS technologies or some advanced countermeasures, the engineer intuition might not be sufficient. Therefore, inferring the leakage function based on profiling is still important. In the state-of-the-art, though, the profiling stage is conducted based on a linear regression in a non-orthonormal basis. This does not allow for an easy interpretation because the components are not independent.