On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy
On collective intentions: collective action in economics and philosophy
复制标题
论集体意图：经济学和哲学中的集体行动
作者：
N. Bardsley
哲学家和经济学家从不同但相关的角度来论述集体行动。本文旨在弥合这些观点。经济学家一直在关注战略背景下的理性问题。在这里，“协作游戏”所带来的问题似乎指向一种理性行动形式，即“团队思维”，而不是个人主义。然而，哲学家对集体意图的分析有时将集体行动简化为一系列个人工具行动。因此，它们没有捕捉到团队思维的第一人称多元视角特征。有问题的是，其他分析描述的意图超出了他人的行为。我提供了一种避免这些问题的集体意向分析。一个集体意图的目的仅仅是引起一个个体的行为，但它的命题内容规定了它在其他思想中的镜像。
Philosophers and economists write about collective action from distinct but related points of view. This paper aims to bridge these perspectives. Economists have been concerned with rationality in a strategic context. There, problems posed by “coordination games” seem to point to a form of rational action, “team thinking,” which is not individualistic. Philosophers’ analyses of collective intention, however, sometimes reduce collective action to a set of individually instrumental actions. They do not, therefore, capture the first person plural perspective characteristic of team thinking. Other analyses, problematically, depict intentions ranging over others’ actions. I offer an analysis of collective intention which avoids these problems. A collective intention aims only at causing an individual action, but its propositional content stipulates its mirroring in other minds.