Evolution of Smartn Players
Evolution of Smartn Players
复制标题
Smartn 播放器的演变
DOI：
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发表时间：
1993
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Stahl
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Stahl
摘要为了对战略情报的演变进行建模，玩家类型从类似于迭代合理化水平的“智能”层次中提取。不合理的策略消失了，但当更高水平的智能产生维护成本时，正确总是和聪明一样好。此外，如果出现了一种明显的游戏方式，那么愚蠢的玩家永远不会消失，而维护成本为正的聪明玩家则会消失。这些结果对超智能玩家的标准博弈论假设提出了质疑。经济文献分类编号：B40、C70、C72、C73。
Abstract To model the evolution of strategic intelligence, player types are drawn from a hierarchy of "smartness" analogous to the levels of iterated rationalizability. Nonrationalizable strategies die out, but when higher levels of smartness incur maintenance costs, being right is always as good as being smart. Moreover, if a manifest way to play emerges, then dumb players never die out, while smarter players with positive maintenance costs vanish. These results call to question the standard game-theoretic assumption of super-intelligent players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: B40, C70, C72, C73.