A Symmetric Safety Valve
A Symmetric Safety Valve
复制标题
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1352002
复制
发表时间：
2009-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
D. Burtraw;K. Palmer;Danny Kahn
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Burtraw;K. Palmer;Danny Kahn
摘要如何在不确定性的情况下制定政策一直是气候政策辩论的核心。对成本的担忧促使人们提出了二氧化碳总量管制与交易计划的建议，该计划设有一个“安全阀”，当边际成本上升到指定的允许价格水平以上时，通过向市场引入额外的排放配额，缓解减排成本的飙升。我们发现两个重要的问题，都源于一个工具，减轻只对价格上涨的不对称性。一个是，在总量管制与交易计划中，价格波动的最重要例子不是发生在价格飙升时，而是发生在允许价格崩溃时。其次，单边安全阀可能会对投资产生意想不到的后果。我们说明，对称的安全阀提供了相对于传统的单边方法的环境和福利的改善。
Abstract How to set policy in the presence of uncertainty has been central in debates over climate policy. Concern about costs has motivated the proposal for a cap-and-trade program for carbon dioxide, with a “safety valve” that would mitigate against spikes in the cost of emission reductions by introducing additional emission allowances into the market when marginal costs rise above the specified allowance price level. We find two significant problems, both stemming from the asymmetry of an instrument that mitigates only against a price increase. One is that most important examples of price volatility in cap-and-trade programs have occurred not when prices spiked, but instead when allowance prices collapsed. Second, a single-sided safety valve may have unintended consequences for investment. We illustrate that a symmetric safety valve provides environmental and welfare improvements relative to the conventional one-sided approach.