Security of quantum key distribution with entangled photons against individual attacks
Security of quantum key distribution with entangled photons against individual attacks
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DOI：
10.1103/physreva.65.052310
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发表时间：
2000-12
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
E. Waks;A. Zeevi;Y. Yamamoto
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
E. Waks;A. Zeevi;Y. Yamamoto
本文研究了纠缠光子量子密钥分配的安全性，重点研究了班尼特，Brasard和Mermin在1992年提出的Bennett-Bennett 1984（BB84）协议（BBM 92）的双光子变体.我们提出了一个安全的证明，适用于现实的来源，和不可信的来源，可以放置在实验室外的两个接收器。证明仅限于个人窃听攻击，并假设检测设备是可信的。我们发现，BBM 92协议的平均碰撞概率是相同的BB84协议与一个理想的单光子源。这表明BBM 92中没有模拟光子分裂攻击，并且可以将源放置在两个接收器之间而不改变碰撞概率的形式。然后，我们比较了两种协议的通信速率作为距离的函数，并表明BBM 92具有更长的通信距离的潜力，高达170公里，在现实的实验缺陷的存在下。最后，我们提出了一个基于纠缠交换的方案，可以导致更长距离的通信。该方案中的限制因素是信道损耗，其在较长距离处施加非常慢的通信速率。
We investigate the security of quantum key distribution with entangled photons, focusing on the two-photon variation of the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol proposed in 1992 by Bennett, Brasard, and Mermin (BBM92). We present a proof of security which applies to realistic sources, and to untrustable sources which can be placed outside the labs of the two receivers. The proof is restricted to individual eavesdropping attacks, and assumes that the detection apparatus is trustable. We find that the average collision probability for the BBM92 protocol is the same as that of the BB84 protocol with an ideal single-photon source. This indicates that there is no analog in BBM92 to photon splitting attacks, and that the source can be placed between the two receivers without changing the form of the collision probability. We then compare the communication rate of both protocols as a function of distance, and show that BBM92 has potential for much longer communication distances, up to 170 km, in the presence of realistic experimental imperfections. Finally, we propose a scheme based on entanglement swapping that can lead to even longer distance communication. The limiting factor in this scheme is the channel loss, which imposes very slow communication rates at longer distances.