It’s Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meetings?

It’s Showtime: Do Managers Report Better News Before Annual Shareholder Meetings?
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DOI:
10.1111/j.1475-679x.2011.00419.x
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发表时间:
2011-05
期刊:
Corporate Governance & Accounting eJournal
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
V. Dimitrov;Prem C. Jain
V. Dimitrov;Prem C. Jain
中科院分区:
其他
文献类型:
--
作者:
V. Dimitrov;Prem C. Jain

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年度股东大会为股东提供了表达对公司业绩的担忧的机会,迫使管理者展示良好的业绩。我们表明,管理者通过在年度股东大会之前报告积极的公司新闻来应对股东压力。具体来说,我们发现年会日前40天的平均累计异常收益显着为正。当股东对管理绩效的不满可能更强烈时,会前回报会显着更高。过去股价表现最差的十分之一公司在会前 40 天期间的平均累计异常回报率为 3.4%,买入并持有回报率为 7.0%。当股东对管理层施加的压力较大时,例如当机构所有权较高、首席执行官薪酬较高以及股东就公司治理提出代理提案时,过去业绩不佳的公司会表现出更高的会前回报。我们通过展示业绩不佳公司的管理者如何在年度股东大会之前管理收益公告和管理层预测公告的时间和内容来补充基于资本充足率的证据。总体而言,结果表明,管理者试图在年度股东大会之前通过正面消息影响股东。
Annual shareholder meetings provide an opportunity for shareholders to express their concerns with corporate performance, pressuring managers to demonstrate good performance. We show that managers respond to the shareholder pressure by reporting positive corporate news before the annual shareholder meetings. Specifically, we find significantly positive average cumulative abnormal returns during the 40 days before the annual meeting date. The pre-meeting returns are significantly higher when shareholder discontent with managerial performance is likely to be stronger. The decile of companies with the worst past stock price performance exhibits average cumulative abnormal returns of 3.4% and buy-and-hold returns of 7.0% during the 40-day pre-meeting period. Companies with poor past performance exhibit even higher pre-meeting returns when shareholder pressure on management is greater, such as when institutional ownership is high, when CEO compensation is high, and when shareholders submit proxy proposals on corporate governance. We complement the evidence based on CARs by showing how managers of poorly performing firms manage the timing and content of earnings announcements and management forecast announcements before the annual shareholder meetings. Overall, the results suggest that managers attempt to influence shareholders before annual shareholder meetings through positive news.