Congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays
Congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays
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国会委员会和联邦支出的政治经济学
DOI：
10.1023/a:1017998621210
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发表时间：
1997
期刊：
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Jason L. Saving
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
R. M. Alvarez;Jason L. Saving
关于美国国会组织的文献一直以“分配”和“信息”理论为主。这两种理论之间分歧的一个重要根源在于它们对个别立法者是否可以从事猪肉桶活动的描述。在这里，我们提供的证据表明，猪肉桶在当代美国国会中仍然存在并且运转良好。我们关注的是权力和选区委员会成员是否可以将不成比例的联邦支出分配给他们的选区。寻找委员会成员的“猪肉桶”活动的有力而系统的证据，为立法组织的分配理论提供了实证支持。
The literature on the organization of the United States Congress has been dominated by “distributive” and “informational” theory. One important source of disagreement between these two theories is their characterization of whether individual legislators can engage in pork-barrel activities. Here we provide evidence which indicates that the pork-barrel is alive and well in the contemporary United States Congress. We focus on whether members of power and constituency committees can direct disproportionate federal expenditures to their districts. Finding strong and systematic evidence of pork-barrel activities by committee members provides empirical support for distributive theories of legislative organization.