Supply chain with random yield and financing
Supply chain with random yield and financing
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DOI：
10.1016/j.omega.2020.102334
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发表时间：
2020-09
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Xiaoyong Yuan;Gongbing Bi;Yalei Fei;Lindong Liu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Xiaoyong Yuan;Gongbing Bi;Yalei Fei;Lindong Liu
本文考虑一个由资金充足的制造商、资金充足且可靠的供应商和随机产量的资金受限且不可靠的供应商组成的供应链。将厂商与供应商之间的互动关系建模为Stackelberg博弈，制造商为领导者，供应商为追随者。导出了供应商的最优生产数量和制造商的最优订货数量。我们研究了考虑固定利率的制造商的最优采购策略。分析模型表明，当有外部融资时，最优采购策略取决于利率阈值。具体而言，当利率低于阈值时，不可靠渠道占主导地位；否则，可靠通道占主导地位。在融资难、可靠供应商供货价格高的情况下，双渠道采购是最优选择。计算研究了初始资本和利率对最优决策和利润的影响。结果表明，资本约束并不一定会降低不可靠供应商对制造商的吸引力。实际上，如果利率较低或不可靠供应商的初始资本较小，则使用不可靠供应商的吸引力会增加。本文考虑了几种扩展。研究表明，当不可靠供应商的采购价格由制造商内生性决定或需求是随机的时，不可靠供应商对制造商的吸引力会增加。
In this paper, we consider a supply chain consisting of a well-capitalized manufacturer, a well-capitalized and reliable supplier, and a capital-constrained and unreliable supplier with random yield. The interactive relationship among them is modeled as a Stackelberg game with the manufacturer as the leader and the suppliers as the followers. The optimal production quantity of the suppliers and ordering quantity of the manufacturer are derived. We investigate the manufacturer's optimal sourcing strategy considering a fixed interest rate. The analytical model shows that when external financing is available, the optimal sourcing strategy depends on the interest rate threshold. Specifically, if the interest rate is lower than the threshold, the unreliable channel dominates; otherwise, the reliable channel dominates. When financing is not available and the supply price of the reliable supplier is high, dual-channel sourcing is the optimal choice. Computational studies are performed to explore the impacts of the initial capital and the interest rate on the optimal decisions and profits. It shows capital constraint does not always decrease the attraction of the unreliable supplier for the manufacturer. Actually the attraction of using an unreliable supplier can increase if the interest rate is low or the initial capital of the unreliable supplier is small. Several extensions are considered in this paper. We show the attraction of the unreliable supplier for the manufacturer will increase if the sourcing price from the unreliable supplier is endogenously determined by the manufacturer or the demand is random.