Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination
Divisible Good Auctions with Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Examination
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DOI：
10.1017/s0022109013000409
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发表时间：
2013-08-01
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Zender, Jaime F.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Morales-Camargo, Emmanuel;Sade, Orly;Zender, Jaime F.
利用实验方法比较了均价拍卖和歧视性拍卖中，当拍卖物品的共同价值不完全信息时的竞价行为和拍卖绩效。在对称信息环境中，不同的拍卖形式提供相同的平均收入。然而，当信息不对称时，歧视性拍卖比统一价格拍卖产生更高的平均收益。在所有处理的统一价格拍卖中，收入的波动性更高。因此，调查结果支持使用歧视性格式。最近拍卖中的主题特征和经验度量被发现有助于解释竞价行为。
An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information environment, the different auction formats provide the same average revenue. However, when information is asymmetric the discriminatory auction results in higher average revenue than the uniform-price auction. The volatility of revenue is higher in the uniform-price auctions in all treatments. The results, therefore, provide support for the use of the discriminatory format. Subject characteristics and measures of experience in recent auctions are found to be useful in explaining bidding behavior.