MATCHING - FINDING A PARTNER FOR LIFE OR OTHERWISE
MATCHING - FINDING A PARTNER FOR LIFE OR OTHERWISE
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DOI：
10.1086/228947
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发表时间：
1988-01-01
影响因子：
4.4
通讯作者：
MORTENSEN, DT
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
MORTENSEN, DT
工作者和夫妻关系是如何形成的，为什么一些配对的人后来分开了？经济学家和博弈理论家正在发展和应用一种基于竞争条件下自愿配对原则的匹配形成和分离的均衡解释。本文的目的是评估这些发展的现状。一般存在的patterns结构的财产，没有人有动机分离已经建立。这些均衡结构最大化的总“价值”的集合中的所有可行的匹配结构的情况下，可转移的效用。根据这种纯粹的匹配理论，至少在无摩擦确定性的条件下，可以预期对合作伙伴的竞争会产生既稳定又具有社会效率的均衡匹配结构。搜索理论模型考虑到会议成本和初始不确定性的匹配值已被开发来解释分离行为作为一个过程的购物“好的匹配。“这些模型表明，在比赛的形成和分离过程中，可能存在几种社会效率低下的情况。最后，劳动经济学家最近提供了支持这一过程观点的经验证据。
How do job-worker and husband-wife relationships form, and why do some matched pairs subsequently separate? Economists and game theorists are in the process of developing and applying an equilibrium explanation of match formation and separation based on the principle of voluntary pairing under competitive conditions. The purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of these developments. The general existence of patnership structures with the property that no one has an incentive to separate has been established. These equilibrium structures maximize aggregate "value" over the set of all feasible match structures in the transferable utility case. According to this pure theory of matching, competition for partners can be expected to yield equilibrium match structures that are both stable and socially efficient, at least under conditions of frictionless certainty. Search-theoretic models that take account of meeting costs and initial uncertainty about match values have been developed to explain separation behavior as a process of shopping for a "good match." These models suggest several possible social inefficiencies in the match formation and separation processes. Finally, labor economists have recently provided empirical evidence that supports this view of the process.