Protecting wi-fi beacons from outsider forgeries
Protecting wi-fi beacons from outsider forgeries
复制标题
保护 Wi-Fi 信标免遭外部伪造
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Christina Pöpper
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Vanhoef;Prasant Adhikari;Christina Pöpper
所有Wi-Fi网络都会定期广播信标，向附近的客户宣布它们的存在。这些信标包含网络的各种属性，包括用于管理客户端行为的动态信息。我们首先展示对手可以伪造信标来实施各种已知和新颖的攻击。受这些攻击的启发，我们提出了一种高效、低带宽开销的信标帧认证方案。我们评估了该方案的安全性能，并讨论了它在Linux上的实现现状。通过与行业合作伙伴的合作，我们的方案也被纳入了802.11标准草案，增加了供应商实施该方案的机会。
All Wi-Fi networks periodically broadcast beacons to announce their presence to nearby clients. These beacons contain various properties of the network, including dynamic information to manage the behavior of clients. We first show that an adversary can forge beacons to carry out various known as well as novel attacks. Motivated by these attacks, we propose a scheme to authenticate beacon frames that is efficient and has low bandwidth overhead. We evaluate the security properties of this scheme, and discuss its current implementation in Linux. By collaborating with industry partners, our scheme also got incorporated into the draft 802.11 standard, increasing the chance of it being implemented by vendors.