Belief's Own Ethics
Belief's Own Ethics
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信仰本身的道德
DOI：
10.7551/mitpress/1554.001.0001
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
J. Adler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Adler
信仰伦理的基本问题是“一个人应该相信什么？”根据证据主义的传统观点，一个人的信念的强度应该与证据成正比。捍卫和挑战证据主义的传统方法依赖于这样一种观念，即一个人应该相信什么，取决于相信什么是理性的、谨慎的、道德的或个人满足的。所有这些方法的共同点是，它们超越信仰本身来确定人们应该相信什么。在这本书中，乔纳森·阿德勒提供了证据主义的强化版本，认为信仰伦理应该植根于信仰的概念——证据主义就是信仰本身的伦理。一个关键的观察结果是，人们不仅不应该相信，而且不能相信，例如，星星的数量是偶数。 “不能”代表的是概念上的障碍，而不仅仅是无能。因此，相信藐视证据（或证据主义）是不可能的。阿德勒解决了诸如非理性信念、合理性、对信念的控制以及证明信念是否需要基础等问题。尽管他将信仰伦理作为认识论的中心议题，但他的思想也涉及理性、论证和实用主义、宗教哲学、伦理学和社会认知心理学。
The fundamental question of the ethics of belief is "What ought one to believe?" According to the traditional view of evidentialism, the strength of one's beliefs should be proportionate to the evidence. Conventional ways of defending and challenging evidentialism rely on the idea that what one ought to believe is a matter of what it is rational, prudent, ethical, or personally fulfilling to believe. Common to all these approaches is that they look outside of belief itself to determine what one ought to believe. In this book Jonathan Adler offers a strengthened version of evidentialism, arguing that the ethics of belief should be rooted in the concept of belief--that evidentialism is belief's own ethics. A key observation is that it is not merely that one ought not, but that one cannot, believe, for example, that the number of stars is even. The "cannot" represents a conceptual barrier, not just an inability. Therefore belief in defiance of one's evidence (or evidentialism) is impossible. Adler addresses such questions as irrational beliefs, reasonableness, control over beliefs, and whether justifying beliefs requires a foundation. Although he treats the ethics of belief as a central topic in epistemology, his ideas also bear on rationality, argument and pragmatics, philosophy of religion, ethics, and social cognitive psychology.