On the existence of fair matching algorithms
On the existence of fair matching algorithms
复制标题
论公平匹配算法的存在性
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Gokturk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
F. Masarani;S. Gokturk
我们分析了罗尔斯正义背景下的盖尔-沙普利匹配问题。定义一个公平的匹配算法的一组4公理（性别无关，对等冷漠，最大最优，稳定性），我们表明，并不是所有的偏好配置文件承认公平的匹配算法，原因是，即使是这组最小公理是太强的意义上。由于稳定性和最大最优性之间的矛盾，即使是产生相互一致匹配的算法，也不可能是公平的，于是我们放宽了公平性的定义（通过优先考虑稳定性而不是最大最小最优性），并再次发现一些偏好简档允许公平匹配算法，而其他偏好简档仍然不允许，但是在这个定义下，现在的相互协议算法是公平的。2然后，本文开发了一个测试，该测试确定对于给定的偏好简档，公平算法是否存在。
We analyze the Gale-Shapley matching problem within the context of Rawlsian justice. Defining a fair matching algorithm by a set of 4 axioms (Gender Indifference, Peer Indifference, Maximin Optimality, and Stability), we show that not all preference profiles admit a fair matching algorithm, the reason being that even this set of minimal axioms is too strong in a sense. Because of conflict between Stability and Maximin Optimality, even the algorithm which generates the mutual agreement match, paradoxically, has no chance to be fair.We then relax the definition of fairness (by giving preference to Stability over Maximin Optimality) and again find that some preference profiles admit a fair matching algorithm, while others still do not, but the mutual agreement algorithm now is fair under this definition.The paper then develops a test, which determines, for a given preference profile, whether a fair algorithm exists or not.