Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Preferential Trade Agreements
Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in Preferential Trade Agreements
复制标题
优惠贸易协定中的争端解决机制
DOI：
10.1177/0022002712445731
复制
发表时间：
2012
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
H. Namgung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hyeran Jo;H. Namgung
在过去的几十年里，优惠贸易协定(PTA)急剧增加，并在全球经济中发挥着重要作用。这些国际协定中的争端解决机制(DSM)对其运作有很大影响。在本文中，作者试图理解是什么因素决定了这些机制的法律安排。作者认为，国内政治体制类型、效仿激励和多边贸易体制发展的交汇决定了它们的法律维度。使用1957至2008年间临时技术贸易协定的数据集，作者表明：(1)民主国家比独裁国家更倾向于适度严格的直接贸易措施，(2)贸易伙伴越来越多地通过采用类似的法律模板相互效仿，(3)最近反对法律机制的趋势在很大程度上是由多边贸易体制的发展推动的。他们的研究结果强调了具体成员因素和宏观因素的重要性，对国际机构的设计具有重要影响。
Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have increased dramatically in the past several decades and play an important role in the global economy. Dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) in these international agreements significantly influence their functioning. In this article, the authors seek to understand what factors determine the legal arrangements of these mechanisms. The authors argue that the confluence of domestic political regime type, emulation incentives, and the development of the multilateral trade regime determines their legal dimension. Using a data set of PTAs between 1957 and 2008, the authors show that (1) democracies are more likely than autocracies to prefer moderately strict DSMs, (2) trading partners increasingly emulate each other by adopting similar legal templates, and (3) the recent trend against legalistic mechanisms is largely driven by the development of the multilateral trade regime. Their findings have important implications for the design of international institutions by highlighting the importance of member-specific as well as macro-level factors.