The Market for Surprises: Selling Substitute Goods Through Lotteries
The Market for Surprises: Selling Substitute Goods Through Lotteries
复制标题
惊喜市场：通过彩票销售替代品
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
João Leão
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Filippo Balestrieri;S. Izmalkov;João Leão
本文研究了多产品垄断者在产品被替代时的收益最大化问题。我们考虑了一个霍特林模型，其中两个水平差异化的商品位于细分市场的端点。消费者统一位于这一细分市场上；他们对每种商品的估值等于基本消费价值减去距离成本。当基本消费价值较高时，卖家通过提供基本的和不透明的商品菜单来最大化她的预期利润。特别是，在凹面成本和线性成本下，基础商品上的单一半对半彩票是最优的。当基础消费价值较低时，只出售基础商品。最后，当基本消费价值处于中间水平时，最优机制可能需要提供具有不交付正概率的彩票。我们的发现可以解释为什么出现了不透明的商品销售(例如，在Hotwire.com或priceline.com上没有对酒店的完整描述的酒店预订)，这是该行业寻找最佳销售方案的结果。
In this paper, we solve the revenue maximization problem of a multi-product monopolist when the products are substitutes. We consider a Hotelling model with two horizontally differentiated goods located at the endpoints of the segment. Consumers are located uniformly on the segment; their valuations for each good are equal to the base consumption value minus distance costs. When the base consumption value is high, the seller maximizes her expected profit by offering a menu of base and opaque goods. In particular, a single half-half lottery over base goods is optimal under concave and linear costs. When base consumption value is low, only base goods are sold. Finally, when base consumption value is intermediate, the optimal mechanism may entail the offering of lotteries with the positive probability of no delivery. Our findings can explain the emergence of opaque goods sales (e.g., hotel bookings without a complete description of the hotel through hotwire.com or priceline.com) as the outcome of the industry’s search for the optimal selling scheme.
DOI：
10.1145/2764468.2764539
发表时间：
2014-09
期刊：
Proceedings of the Sixteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
影响因子：
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作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos
通讯作者：
C. Daskalakis;Alan Deckelbaum;Christos Tzamos