Aristotle on the Virtue of the Multitude
Aristotle on the Virtue of the Multitude
复制标题
亚里士多德论大众的美德
DOI：
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Daniela Cammack
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daniela Cammack
人们普遍认为，亚里士多德提出的一个支持大众政治权威的论点是，大群体可以通过汇集他们的知识来做出比个人或小群体单独做出的更好的决策。这是由两个类比支持，一个显然涉及“家常便饭”和其他审美判断。本文认为，亚里士多德的论点的解释是难以置信的历史背景和文本的几个特点。它认为，亚里士多德对群众统治的支持不是基于其上级知识，而是基于他的信念，即当个人集体行动时，他们的美德可以被聚合甚至放大。这显著地改变了我们对亚里士多德政治思想的理解，并为今天流行的大众政治活动的认识论辩护提供了一个强有力的替代方案。
It is generally believed that one argument advanced by Aristotle in favor of the political authority of the multitude is that large groups can make better decisions by pooling their knowledge than individuals or small groups can make alone. This is supported by two analogies, one apparently involving a “potluck dinner” and the other aesthetic judgment. This article suggests that that interpretation of Aristotle’s argument is implausible given the historical context and several features of the text. It argues that Aristotle’s support for the rule of the multitude rested not on its superior knowledge but rather on his belief that the virtue of individuals can be aggregated and even amplified when they act collectively. This significantly alters our understanding of Aristotle’s political thought and presents a powerful alternative to the epistemic defenses of mass political activity popular today.