Electoral institutions and information shortcuts: The effect of decisive intraparty competition on the behavior of voters and party elites
Electoral institutions and information shortcuts: The effect of decisive intraparty competition on the behavior of voters and party elites
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选举制度与信息捷径：党内决定性竞争对选民和政党精英行为的影响
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发表时间：
2006
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通讯作者：
Melody E. Valdini
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作者：
Melody E. Valdini
我们知道选民会利用信息捷径，但什么会影响选民和政党的线索呢？我通过分析不同选举制度下的选民和政党行为，以及腐败后环境中发生的选举来研究这个问题。其中一项选举规则是本文的重点：决定性的党内偏好投票。我认为，一个选举制度，包括决定性的党内偏好投票创造了一个激励选民依赖于从特定的候选人特质的线索。此外，我认为，党的精英预计，并通过不同类型的候选人选择的政党名单，从而代表政党提名的候选人的特质将因选举制度而异的选民行为。此外，我认为，腐败的选举环境改变了某些线索的极性，但腐败的影响和由此产生的极性转换是，在一定程度上，由选举制度决定的。我的理论是用假设来检验的，这些假设采用了妇女代表权的预测结果。如果选民像我预测的那样使用信息捷径，如果这些捷径对候选人和政党产生了我预测的影响，那么这种行为应该反映在政党名单和各自立法机构中的女性比例上。因此，我测试我的理论，使用跨国，跨时间的回归分析，在欧洲国家的女性立法者和候选人的比例，以及通过案例研究分析，妇女在爱尔兰和西班牙的立法机构的代表性。我的研究结果证实，决定性的党内偏好投票激励选民依赖基于特质的信息捷径，而且，这种依赖对立法机构中的女性代表性产生了负面影响
We know that information shortcuts are used by voters, but what affects the cues that voters will take and parties will give? I examine this question through an analysis of voter and party behavior under different electoral systems, and in elections that occur in post-corruption environments. One electoral rule in particular is the focus of this dissertation: the decisive intraparty preference vote. I argue that an electoral system that includes the decisive intraparty preference vote creates an incentive for voters to rely upon cues drawn from specific candidate traits. Further, I argue that party elites anticipate and respond to this voter behavior through varying the types of candidates selected for the party lists, and thus that the traits of candidates nominated to represent the parties will vary by electoral system. Additionally, I argue that an electoral environment of corruption changes the polarity of certain cues, but that the effect of the corruption and resulting polarity switch is, in part, determined by the electoral system. My theories are tested using hypotheses that employ the predicted outcomes for women's representation. If voters are using information shortcuts as I predict, and if these shortcuts have the effects on candidates and parties that I predict, then this behavior should be reflected in the percentage of women on the party lists and in the respective legislatures. Thus, I test my theories using cross-national, cross-temporal regression analyses of the percentage of women legislators and candidates in European states, as well as through case study analyses of the representation of women in the legislatures of Ireland and Spain. My findings confirm that the decisive intraparty preference vote creates an incentive for voters to rely upon trait-based information shortcuts, and further, that this reliance has a negative impact on the representation of women in legislatures