Round Up the Usual Suspects: Blame and the Subprime Crisis
Round Up the Usual Suspects: Blame and the Subprime Crisis
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围捕通常的嫌疑人：指责与次贷危机
DOI：
10.1080/13563460903553657
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Timothy J Sinclair
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Timothy J Sinclair
金融危机的一个不同寻常之处在于，它们经常引发一个政治过程，与追捕危险的重罪犯或好莱坞老电影中与坏人的摊牌有着惊人的相似之处。在20世纪90年代末的亚洲金融危机中，罪魁祸首是“裙带资本主义”，富裕国家的政客们热切地追求这一目标，转移了他们对困扰该地区的金融灾难可能承担的任何责任。2001年安然公司的倒闭导致人们的注意力转移到了各种机构，包括美国的批发信用评级机构、穆迪投资者服务公司和标准普尔。随着2007年夏天剧烈的金融动荡的回归，美国的机构似乎成为了头号公敌。本文认为，道德恐慌在脆弱时期服务于关键的政治目标，在这种情况下，它约束了一些最极端的金融创新形式，但也削弱了关于全球金融内在问题的反霸权主张。
One of the remarkable things about financial crises is that they often give rise to a political process with uncanny similarities to the hunt for a dangerous felon, or the showdown with the bad guy in an old-time Hollywood movie. In the Asian crisis of the late 1990s the culprit was ‘crony capitalism’, and rich country politicians pursued this target zealously, deflecting any blame they might have taken for the financial catastrophe that afflicted that region. The failure of Enron Corporation in 2001 caused the spotlight to shift to various institutions, including the American wholesale credit rating agencies, Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's. With the return of dramatic financial volatility in the summer of 2007, the American agencies seemed to become public enemy number one. This article suggests that moral panic serves key political objectives in fragile times, in this instance disciplining some of the most extreme forms of financial innovation, but also undermining counter-hegemonic claims about the inherent problems of global finance.