Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks
Bargaining and Efficiency in Networks
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1755226
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发表时间：
2010-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Dilip Abreu;Mihai Manea
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Dilip Abreu;Mihai Manea
我们研究了无限的地平线游戏，其中连接在网络中的一对玩家可以随机匹配以在单位盈余上讨价还价。达成协议的玩家无需更换即可从网络中删除。有效匹配的全球逻辑和讨价还价的本地性质，结合了达成协议后的不可逆转的球员对出口，为达到平衡的效率带来了严重的障碍。对于许多网络而言，马尔可夫所有议价游戏的完美平衡效率也降低，即使玩家变得耐心也是如此。我们调查了如何进行激励措施，以通过次级完美但非马克维亚的平衡来实现效率。该分析扩展到一个替代模型，在该模型中，根据某些概率分布选择各个玩家，并且选择的玩家可以选择与之讨价还价的邻居。
We study an infinite horizon game in which pairs of players connected in a network are randomly matched to bargain over a unit surplus. Players who reach agreement are removed from the network without replacement. The global logic of efficient matchings and the local nature of bargaining, in combination with the irreversible exit of player pairs following agreements, create severe hurdles to the attainment of efficiency in equilibrium. For many networks all Markov perfect equilibria of the bargaining game are inefficient, even as players become patient. We investigate how incentives need to be structured in order to achieve efficiency via subgame perfect, but non-Markovian, equilibria. The analysis extends to an alternative model in which individual players are selected according to some probability distribution, and a chosen player can select a neighbor with whom to bargain.