Transboundary Pollution, Tax Competition and the Efficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Regulation
Transboundary Pollution, Tax Competition and the Efficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Regulation
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DOI：
10.1111/caje.12401
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发表时间：
2018-01
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通讯作者：
Atsushi Yamagishi
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作者：
Atsushi Yamagishi
令人惊讶的是，Ogawa和Wildasin （2009, American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-1217）发现，在资本税收竞争下，即使存在跨境污染，不协调的政策制定也会导致最佳结果。然而，我表明，如果环境监管水平是内生的，那么与最优水平相比，监管水平会变得过于宽松（“逐底竞争”）。因此，尽管Ogawa和Wildasin（2009）的效率结果，但需要努力实现国际环境政策协调。然后，我考察了这一结果对决定性选民资本禀赋水平的依赖性。如果决定性选民的资本禀赋低于平均水平，不协调的监管总是比最优监管宽松。相反，不协调的监管如果高于平均水平（“力争上游”），可能会变得效率低下。
Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009, American Economic Review, 99(4), 1206-1217) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first-best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum ("race to the bottom"). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve an international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. If the decisive voter's capital endowment is below the average, uncoordinated regulation is always looser than the optimum. On the contrary, uncoordinated regulation may become inefficiently strict if it is above the average ("race to the top").