Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (But Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement
Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (But Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement
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不仅仅是一个真相测量者：在同伴分歧的情况下认真对待自己（但不要太认真）
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
期刊：
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通讯作者：
D. Enoch
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Enoch
当你发现其他人--在这些问题上和你一样可靠--不同意你对一个命题的真值的看法时，你应该如何更新你对这个命题的信念（程度）？现在有几个不同的答案这个问题-问题的“同行分歧”-在文献中，但没有，我认为，是似是而非的。更重要的是，文献中没有一个答案将同侪分歧的争论置于规范认识论最普遍的传统关注中的自然位置。在本文中，我试图做得更好。我首先要强调的是，我们不能也不应该把自己当作“真理测量器”--仅仅是有一定概率追踪真理的设备。我认为，真理仪的观点是平等的重量的观点在同行分歧的背景下的主要动机。考虑到这一事实，关于同伴分歧的讨论变得更加复杂，对相关背景信念程度（包括条件信念）的合理性以及在怀疑论讨论中出现的一些最普遍的观点都很敏感。我认为，这样理解，同侪分歧是不太特殊的认识现象比可能被认为，所以有很少的方式，我们可以给一般的同侪分歧的积极理论。
How should you update your (degrees of) belief about a proposition, when you find out that someone else – as reliable as you are in these matters – disagrees with you about its truth value? There are now several different answers to this question – the question of ‘peer disagreement’ – in the literature, but none, I think, is plausible. Even more importantly, none of the answers in the literature places the peer-disagreement debate in its natural place among the most general traditional concerns of normative epistemology. In this paper I try to do better. I start by emphasizing how we cannot and should not treat ourselves as ‘truthometers’ – merely devices with a certain probability of tracking the truth. I argue that the truthometer view is the main motivation for the Equal Weight View in the context of peer-disagreement. With this fact in mind, the discussion of peer-disagreement becomes more complicated, sensitive to the justification of the relevant background degrees of belief (including the conditional ones), and to some of the most general points that arise in the context of discussions of scepticism. I argue that thus understood, peer-disagreement is less special as an epistemic phenomenon than may be thought, and so that there is very little by way of positive theory that we can give about peer-disagreement in general.