UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “PROBLEM”: A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.
UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE “PROBLEM”: A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.
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全能银行并不是解决美国公司治理“问题”的答案：德国、日本和美国的情况
DOI：
10.1111/j.1745-6622.1997.tb00624.x
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发表时间：
1996
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
G. Miller
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Macey;G. Miller
本文反对最近法律的和经济学者将德国全能银行和日本主要银行的公司治理角色“浪漫化”的倾向。银行作为贷款人和股东的利益之间存在潜在冲突，这可能使银行成为外部股东的不理想监督者。Macey和米勒引用了日本企业借款人支付高于市场利率的银行融资的证据，将高利率解释为日本银行在其贷款组合上赚取的“租金”，以换取（1）使借款企业的现任管理层免受敌意收购，（2）接受其股权的次优回报。1997年摩根士丹利。
This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings. 1997 Morgan Stanley.