Critical-Level Population Principles and the Repugnant Conclusion
Critical-Level Population Principles and the Repugnant Conclusion
复制标题
临界水平人口原则和令人反感的结论
DOI：
10.1007/978-1-4020-2473-3_4
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发表时间：
2004
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
D. Donaldson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Blackorby;W. Bossert;D. Donaldson
人口原则扩展了固定人口的社会善良的关系，使他们可以排名不同的人口和人口规模的替代品。通常讨论的大多数人口原则都是福利主义的：任何一对选择的排序都只取决于在这两个选择中活着的人的福利。因此，关于所有曾经住在一起的人的信息以及他们的终身效用水平（被解释为终身幸福的个人指标）足以建立福利主义的社会排名。此外，这些人口原则通常是匿名的：不需要关于个人身份的信息。无差别性为帕菲特（1984）的“非同一性问题”提供了一个解决方案，并确保个人利益得到平等对待。由于关于幸福的信息在福利主义原则中扮演着如此重要的角色，因此将它们与格里芬（1986）或萨姆纳（1996）对幸福的全面描述相结合是很重要的。此外，将个人效用解释为一生福祉的指标，对于避免关于终止生命的违反直觉的建议至关重要。为了研究人口原则的伦理属性，重要的是要知道代表中立性的效用水平。我们遵循标准惯例，并确定终身效用水平为零的中性生命的价值。对于一个人来说，一个中性的生活是一个与他或她没有经历的生活一样好的生活。在中立之上，生活作为一个整体是值得生活的;在中立之下，它就不值得生活了。因为不存在的人没有利益或偏好，所以说一个人通过以高于中性的效用水平存在而获益是没有意义的。当然，如果说一个人因为从一种危及生命的疾病中幸存下来而继续活着，这是完全有道理的。这种变化影响的是寿命的长短，而不是存在本身。[2]在福利主义的人口原则中，固定人口功利主义的可变人口扩展起着主导作用。固定人口效用主义通过比较总效用或平均效用，对任何两个具有相同个体的选择进行排名。有许多方法可以将固定人口功利主义扩展到可变人口框架，我们称其固定人口子原则是功利主义的人口原则为相同的-
Population principles extend fixed-population social goodness relations so that they can rank alternatives with different populations and population sizes. Most of the population principles commonly discussed are welfarist: the ranking of any pair of alternatives depends on the well-being of those alive in the two alternatives only. Thus, information about all those who ever live together with their levels of lifetime utility (interpreted as individual indicators of lifetime well-being) is sufficient to establish a welfarist social ranking. Furthermore, these population principles are typically anonymous: information about individual identities is not needed. Anonymity provides a solution to Parfit’s [1984]‘non-identity problem’and ensures that individual interests receive equal treatment. Because information about well-being plays such an important role in welfarist principles, it is important to couple them with a comprehensive account of well-being such as that of Griffin (1986) or of Sumner (1996). In addition, the interpretation of individual utilities as indicators of lifetime well-being is essential to avoid counter-intuitive recommendations regarding the termination of lives. In order to investigate the ethical properties of population principles, it is important to know the utility level that represents neutrality. We follow the standard convention and identify the value of a neutral life with a lifetime-utility level of zero. For an individual, a neutral life is one which is as good as one in which he or she has no experiences. 1 Above neutrality, life, as a whole, is worth living; below neutrality, it is not. Because people who do not exist do not have interests or preferences, it does not make sense to say that an individual gains by being brought into existence with a utility level above neutrality. It makes perfect sense, of course, to say that an individual gains or loses by continuing to live because of surviving a life-threatening illness, say. Such a change affects length of life, not existence itself. 2 Within the class of welfarist population principles, variable-population extensions of fixed-population utilitarianism play a dominant role. Fixed-population utilitarianism ranks any two alternatives with the same individuals alive in both by comparing their total or average utilities. There are many ways of extending fixedpopulation utilitarianism to a variable-population framework, and we call a population principle whose fixed-population subprinciples are utilitarian a same-