Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind

Growing up blind does not change the neural bases of Theory of Mind
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DOI:
10.1073/pnas.0900010106
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发表时间:
2009-07-07
影响因子:
11.1
通讯作者:
Saxe, Rebecca R.
Saxe, Rebecca R.
中科院分区:
综合性期刊1区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Bedny, Marina;Pascual-Leone, Alvaro;Saxe, Rebecca R.

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人类对他人的心理状态进行推理;这种能力被称为心理理论(ToM)。在发育正常的成年人中,心理理论由一组一致的大脑区域支持:双侧颞顶交界区(TPJ)、内侧前额叶皮质(MPFC)、楔前叶(PC)和前颞沟(aSTS)。经验和内在的生物因素如何相互作用,以产生这种成人功能的个人资料是未知的。在目前的研究中,我们通过研究先天失明的成年人来探讨视觉体验在心理理论网络发展中的作用。在实验1中,参与者听故事并回答有关故事的真/假问题。这些故事要么是关于现实的心理表征,要么是关于现实的物理表征(例如,照片)。在实验2中,参与者听了关于人们基于视觉或听觉的信念的故事;人们的身体感觉(例如,饥饿);和没有人的控制故事。参与者判断每个故事是否有积极或消极的效价。我们发现,有视力和先天性失明的成年人的心理理论大脑区域是类似的本地化和功能特异性。在先天性失明的成年人中,对精神状态的推理导致双侧TPJ、MPFC、PC和aSTS的活动。这些大脑区域对关于信念的段落的反应比对关于非信念表征的段落或关于身体感觉的段落的反应更强烈。此外,先天性失明和视力正常的人对基于视觉的精神状态的推理也是相似的。尽管先天失明的成年人有着不同的发展经历,但他们都有一个典型的心理理论网络。我们的结论是,心理理论的神经机制的发展取决于先天因素和经验,在抽象的水平上,amodally。
Humans reason about the mental states of others; this capacity is called Theory of Mind (ToM). In typically developing adults, ToM is supported by a consistent group of brain regions: the bilateral temporoparietal junction (TPJ), medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), precuneus (PC), and anterior temporal sulci (aSTS). How experience and intrinsic biological factors interact to produce this adult functional profile is not known. In the current study we investigate the role of visual experience in the development of the ToM network by studying congenitally blind adults. In experiment 1, participants listened to stories and answered true/false questions about them. The stories were either about mental or physical representations of reality (e.g., photographs). In experiment 2, participants listened to stories about people's beliefs based on seeing or hearing; people's bodily sensations (e.g., hunger); and control stories without people. Participants judged whether each story had positive or negative valance. We find that ToM brain regions of sighted and congenitally blind adults are similarly localized and functionally specific. In congenitally blind adults, reasoning about mental states leads to activity in bilateral TPJ, MPFC, PC, and aSTS. These brain regions responded more to passages about beliefs than passages about nonbelief representations or passages about bodily sensations. Reasoning about mental states that are based on seeing is furthermore similar in congenitally blind and sighted individuals. Despite their different developmental experience, congenitally blind adults have a typical ToM network. We conclude that the development of neural mechanisms for ToM depends on innate factors and on experiences represented at an abstract level, amodally.