COLLECTIVE LABOR SUPPLY AND WELFARE
COLLECTIVE LABOR SUPPLY AND WELFARE
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DOI：
10.1086/261825
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发表时间：
1992-06-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
CHIAPPORI, PA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
CHIAPPORI, PA
本文发展了一个一般的，“集体”的家庭劳动力供给模型，代理人的特点是他们自己的（可能是利他的）偏好，和家庭的决策只假设是帕累托有效的。另一种解释是，内部决策过程有两个阶段：代理人首先根据某种给定的分享规则分享非劳动收入;然后每个人最优地选择自己的劳动供给和消费。此设置显示为生成可测试的劳动力供应限制。此外，劳动力供给行为的观察足以恢复个人偏好和共享规则（直到一个常数）。最后，传统的福利分析工具可以适应新的环境。
The paper develops a general, "collective" model of household labor supply in which agents are characterized by their own (possibly altruistic) preferences, and household decisions are only assumed to be Pareto efficient. An alternative interpretation is that there are two stages in the internal decision process: agents first share nonlabor income, according to some given sharing rule; then each one optimally chooses his or her own labor supply and consumption. This setting is shown to generate testable restrictions on labor supplies. Moreover, the observation of labor supply behavior is sufficient for recovering individual preferences and the sharing rule (up to a constant). Finally, the traditional tools of welfare analysis can be adapted to the new setting.